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Islam, Islamism and the westRelation between Islam and Islamism
While some experts on Islam reject the notion that Islam is inherently political (e.g. Fred Halliday and John Esposito), others (including Robert Spencer, Bat Ye'or, Andrew Bostom[2] and Bernard Lewis) concur, arguing that political stances characterized as Islamist are actually central to Islam as a faith. They also question the validity of the terms "Islamist" and "Islamism" themselves. Some Muslims do not see a difference between Islamism and Islam at all, saying "If Islam is a way of life, how can we say that those who want to live by its principles in legal, social, political, economic, and political spheres of life are not Muslims, but Islamists and believe in Islamism, not Islam"?[3] Like other religions, Islam promotes a vision of society and provides guidelines for social life. The Qur'an and the hadith outline Islamic governance, including criminal law, family law, and the prohibition of usury (as well as other economic regulations that are highly contentious in the Arab world). A polarizing controversy exists as to whether Muslims who live in non-Muslim countries can fully exercise their religion while living there. Authors such as the American historian Ira Lapidus define Islamists as Muslim movements having specifically political agendas. Devout Muslims (as well as Muslims who promote Islam socially without entering the political sphere) are thus excluded from the notion of Islamism.[4] Political Islam, whether we choose to label it as Islamism or not, represents a form of ideological protest, solidarity, unity of belief, aspirations, goals and aims and so on, to those people who believe in it. Moreover, "No less significant has been the role of Islamic fundamentalism as an ideology of protest against arbitrary rule and socioeconomic injustice. In the absence of other institutional and ideological channels of opposition, fundamentalism has provided a religiously sanctioned means for the articulation of popular dissatisfaction"[5] Political Islam in this sense represents a 'natural' response to the failure of the political systems in the Muslim countries to address and meet the demands and aspirations of certain groups within the Muslim society. Furthermore, the use of Islam by 'Islamists' is not their innovation. In fact, Islam has been used throughout the Islamic history as a justification tool for political reasons by both governments and oppositions. According to Bernard Lewis who uses the term "activist Muslim" instead of "Islamist":[6] "There are in particular two political traditions, one of which might be called quietist, the other activist. The arguments in favor of both are based, as are most early Islamic arguments, on the Holy Book and on the actions and sayings of the Prophet. The quietist tradition obviously rests on the Prophet as sovereign, as judge and statesman. But before the Prophet became a head of state, he was a rebel. Before he traveled from Mecca to Medina, where he became sovereign, he was an opponent of the existing order. He led an opposition against the pagan oligarchy of Mecca and at a certain point went into exile and formed what in modern language might be called a "government in exile," with which finally he was able to return in triumph to his birthplace and establish the Islamic state in Mecca...The Prophet as rebel has provided a sort of paradigm of revolution—opposition and rejection, withdrawal and departure, exile and return. Time and time again movements of opposition in Islamic history tried to repeat this pattern." Controversy
The usage of the words/concepts/terms 'Islam' and 'Islamism' are controversial and highly politicized. It is rarely attempted to address and or approach Islam in the West 'fairly'. Islam and Muslims are often subjects to prejudgements and misconceptions. This is by no means a result of a new phenomenon. "For most of the Middle Ages and during the early part of the Renaissance in Europe, Islam was believed to be demonic religion of apostasy, blasphemy, and obscurity. It did not seem to matter that Muslims considered Mohammed a prophet and not a god; what mattered to Christians was that Mohammed was a false prophet, a sower of discord, a sensualist, a hypocrite, an agent of the devil....Real events in the real world made of Islam a considerable political force. For hundreds of years great Islamic armies and navies threatened Europe, destroyed its outposts, colonized its domains..... Even when the world of Islam entered a period of decline and Europe a period of ascendancy, fear of 'Mohammedanism' persisted. Closer to Europe than any of the other non-Christian religions, the Islamic world by its very adjacency evoked memories of its encroachments on Europe, and always, of its latent power again and again to disturb the West. Other great civilizations of the East- India and China among them- could be thought of as defeated and distant and hence not a constant worry. Only Islam seemed never to have submitted completely to the West; and when, after the dramatic oil-price rises of the early 1970s, the Muslim world seemed once more on the verge of repeating its early conquests, the whole West seemed to shudder."[7] But it is not only the West. The Muslim world also shares the hostile perception about the other side as a result of the interpretation of history. This goes back to "the invasion of Iberia in the seventh century, through the crusades which began in the eleventh century, then through the conflicts with the Ottoman empire that lasted from the fifteenth century to the collapse of that last Islamic challenge in 1918", all of which have fed into the belief of Western hostility towards Islam in the hearts and minds of Muslims. [8] The problematic relationship between the two sides is not solely a result of old history. The end of the Cold War is often believed to have led to the (re)emergence of the 'old' conflict between Islam and the West. "The inner need of western society for a menacing, but subordinated 'other'" is alleged to be the indirect cause allowing the conflict to re-shape itself. However, it is unfair to say that this 'neo conflict' is a product of the West. The end of the Cold War led to the breakdown of communism worldwide especially its perceived threat to the Third World, including the Muslim countries. This meant the end of a ‘common enemy’. Consequently, there was a steady diminishing need for continuous high level cooperation similar to that existed between the West and Islam during the Cold War which led the latter to (re)direct itself against the West. The (re)adoption of the term jihad, this time to face the West with it rather than communism, Islamists' expressions of harsh, 'racial' over-generalised views- such as zionists, capitalists, colonialists etc.- about the West, the US more often, Jews (& Israel) among others, in addition to the allegations against some Islamic countries of supporting 'terrorist' organisations and so on, all contributed towards the affirmation of the 'Islamic threat' in the hearts and minds of the Westerners. These two points of the history legacy and the post-Cold War reality led to the politicisation of the term Islamism as indicated earlier. Given that the term applies to a wide range of organizations and groups (including moderates as well as radicals), many Muslims with moderate views find the term troublesome when applied to their own organizations. Many also reject the term because they associate it with political extremism and radicalism, which they do not support: for instance, Islamist groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brothers participate—though as independent candidates—in democratic elections, and reformers such as Tunisian Rashid Al-Ghanouchi support the idea of democracy and oppose any forced implementation of sharia law. Post 9/11 IssuesThe complex relationship between Islam and Islamism has intensified in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Since that time, Islamist movements, along with other political movements inspired by Islam, have gained increased attention in the Western media. Some Islamist groups have been implicated in terrorism and have become targets in the War on Terrorism. An important field of discussion that has developed during the “war on terror” period post 9-11 is how the war can be measured as a success or indeed what where the objectives of those that undertook the September eleventh atrocity. It is then not without Irony that as the War on Terror seeks to give democracy to those who have none, the key benefactors will be the opposition groups of which a sizable number will be Islamist in nature. "While ignoring the overwhelming majority of Islamists who have nothing to do with terror and making them virtually irrelevant and stigmatized in Western political discourse.... To ignore the complexity of political Islam and tar all Islamists with the same brush of terrorism guarantees Bin Laden's success."[9] Even at this advanced stage little is known about the exact objectives of the terrorists however it is unlikely that it was simply to cause the initial death and destruction. The only criteria that can be judged a success so far for the war of terror is control of the middle eastern oil supply and the affirmation that conventional warfare cannot be fought against the US and it allies. Whilst the wider Muslim community understood the action against the Taliban in Afghanistan, the later Iraq campaign has been a public relations disaster with the people of the Middle East. “The main target of 11 September is not US power or a somewhat carelessly defined ‘civilised’ or ‘democratic’ world, but the states of the Middle East themselves.”[10] The war on terror was “carte blanche” for authoritarian regimes that were coming under pressure from democracy groups and Islamist political opposition who have used the “Terrorist” and “Religious Fanatic” tag on opposition groups, often in a manner that makes the populace despise the regime and the West for what they feel is removing their control over their own destiny. Perhaps the clearest and most damaging result of the war on terror so far is that democracy in the Middle East has fallen in the years since 2001 in the measurements by the Middle East Forum. “Arabs are stuck in autocracy and have far to go before any Arab country achieves democracy. The lack of progress over the past six years—especially at a time when democratization has become a primary goal of Western policy—suggests Arab rulers have shifted their rhetoric but not their policies. Many may believe they can outlast Washington's democracy focus.”[11] The war on terror has certainly not functioned as a catalyst for democracy further fuelling anti US and anti western sentiment. “This hollow pluralism complacently sanctioned by the west is used to hide the locking-up of the institutional system and the standardization of a very high level of repression. This pernicious mixture feeds double radicalisation.”[12] Until this perceived assistance to oppressors is addressed, many people will see Islamist parties as a vote for protecting their rights, combating corruption and a bulwark against western influence which is rightly or wrongly perceived as a key supporter of their governments’ oppression and those oppressing the wider Muslim/Arab community. Islamist IdeologyIslamist ideology finds its roots in a widespread sense of alienation and exclusion that followed the failure of the various developmental and modernization experiments carried out in Arab countries, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s. In essence, it sees these policies and governments as: 1) secular in nature, and therefore doomed to failure; 2) imposed from outside – i.e. the West. Although they enabled ruling elites to prosper, they brought no benefit to the vast majority of people. The often anti-Western nature of Islamist rhetoric is thus directed not only at “outsiders”, but also at those better-off more “Westernised” classes within Arab societies. Nazih Ayubi has described the socio-economic impact of this exclusion and alienation. The lack of jobs and therefore lack of purchasing power meant “social defeat”. Thus: “…radical Islamists, frustrated over the lack of jobs, houses and commodities, are seeking to turn social defeat into moral victory.”[13] Gilles Kepel goes further, describing Islamists as: “…living symbols, and their numbers are massive, of the failure of the independent state’s modernization projects.”[14] Even though Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or Hamas provide important health and social services at a local level, accoridng to Ayubi Islamists argue that “Islam is the solution” (‘’al-islam huwa al-hall’’) and wish simply to “escape upwards” without providing practical solutions.[15] Fear of Cultural Hegemony of the West Since the 1970s, an increasing number of movements now identified as Islamist have advocated a re-Islamisation of society, since according to some; "For Islamists, the primary threat of the West is cultural rather than political or economic. Cultural dependency robs one of faith and identity and thus destroys Islam and the Islamic community (ummah) far more effectively than political rule."[16] HistoryEarliest History and Classical ThinkersIslamist is a modern term that came into popular use towards the end of the twentieth century, but similar movements are to be found throughout Islamic history, including the Wahabis of the 18th century in Saudi Arabia, and Ibn Taimiya (1263-1328), a Damascene law specialist. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, usage of the term "Islamism" dates to 1747.[17] The End of the 19th CenturyThe end of the 19th century was the time of the slow disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, a time of religious and cultural decline. The empire was financially and militarily dependent on European powers, including Britain, France, and Germany. In this context, the publications of Jamal ad-din al-Afghani (1837-97), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) became popular among small groups of followers who considered their messages important in thinking about indigenous alternatives to the political, economic, and cultural decline of the empire. Their ideas included the rejection of any change to Islam after 855, among them the Islamic schools of law (madhhabs) since they were considered deviations from the true Islam. Society should return to the true messages of Islam, remove the wrong interpretations and additions of the past centuries, and create a truly Islamic society under sharia law. Sayyid Abul Ala MaududiSayyid Abul Ala Maududi was an important early twentieth-century figure in the Islamic revival in India, and then after independence from Britain, in Pakistan. Trained as a lawyer he chose the profession of journalism, and wrote about contemporary issues. Most of his writings addressed topics of Islamic law,[18] governance, and human rights.[19] He was an inspirational figure for modern Islamist groups in Pakistan and India, and Muslims elsewhere. Maududi advocated the creation of an Islamic state governed by sharia, Islamic law, as interpreted by Shura councils. Maududi founded the Jamaat-e-Islami in 1941 and remained at its head until 1972. His extremely influential book, "Towards Understanding Islam" (Risalat Diniyat in Arabic), placed Islam in modern context and enabled not only conservative ulema but liberal modernizers such as al-Faruqi, whose "Islamization of Knowledge" carried forward some of Maududi's key principles. Chief among these was the basic compatibility of Islam with an ethical scientific view. Quoting from Maududi's own work:
Maududi was both less revolutionary and less politically/economically populist than later Islamists like Qutb.[20] The Muslim Brotherhood
Maududi's political ideas were a strong influence on Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, who also believed pagan ignorance (or jahiliyya) had reasserted itself in the Muslim world and must be vanquished. Qutb was one of the key philosophers in the Muslim Brotherhood movement, the first, largest and probably most influential modern Islamic political/religious organization. The Brotherhood was established by Hasan al-Banna in Ismailiyah, Egypt in 1928 who was assassinated in 1949 in retaliation for the assassination of Egypt's premier Mahmud Fami Naqrashi three months earlier. [4] It was banned in 1948 and again following confrontations with Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser, who jailed Qutb and thousands of others for several years, but still exists [5] with a status sometimes described as a "semi-legal." [6] The Muslim Brotherhood advocated a return to Shari'ah and used the motto "The Qur'an is our constitution." [7] Since only divine guidance could lead humans to peace, justice, and prosperity, it followed that Muslims should eschew Western values and man-made systems of governance and live according to the divine law of the Shari'ah. This, they believed, could be done by using as a model laws followed by the early Caliphates known for their harmony, stability, prosperity and protection of Muslim lives, interests and global influence. The Brotherhood also advocated Jihad against the European colonial powers, particularly the British and the French, and their allies, who ruled over virtually all of the Muslim world during al-Banna's lifetime. The Six Day War of 1967: Reawakening of Islamic ResurgenceThe quick defeat of the Arab troops during the Six Day War by Israeli troops constituted a pivotal event for mainstream Islamic groups; The event led to a major loss of popularity and credibility of both secular and nationalist politics and strengthened Islamist movements throughout the Middle East. The concept of an Islamic resurgence was developed during this time by Islamist thinkers such as Mawlana Maududi, leading towards a new form of Islamist radicalism on the one side and a re-Islamisation of many Muslim societies on the other side of the spectrum.[21] The Events of 19791979 was a pivotal year for Islamists, with three huge events in the Muslim world:
Iranian Islamic Revolution
The first Islamist state (with the possible exception of Zia's Pakistan) was established not among Sunni but among the Shia of Iran. In what was nothing short of a major shock to the rest of the world, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini led an Islamic Revolution of 1979 to overthrow the oil rich, rapidly Westernizing and pro-American secular monarchy ruled by Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. Khomeini's beliefs were similar to those of Sunni Islamists like Mawdudi and Qutb: He thought imitation of early Muslims and restoration of Sharia law was essential to Islam, that secular, Westernizing Muslims were actually agents of Western interests, and that "plundering" of Muslim lands was part of a long-term conspiracy against Islam by the Christian West.[22] But they also differed:
Initial enthusiasm in the Muslim world for the revolution waned -- particularly during the course of the Iran-Iraq War, an 8-year-long and enormously bloody war, that evolved into an ultimately unsuccessful campaign to replace neighboring, secular, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein with an Islamic Republic.[24] The Islamic Republic has also not yet achieved many of its goals: raising standards of living; ridding Iran of corruption, poverty, political oppression and Westernization, or even protecting Sharia from innovation ([8]). It has been modestly successful in increasing rate of literacy[25][26] and health care,[27] and it has maintained its hold on power in Iran in spite of the U.S. economic sanctions and created or assisted like-minded Shia Islamist groups in Iraq (SCIRI) and Lebanon (Hezbollah,) (two Muslim countries that also have large Shiite populations). Currently, the Iranian government has enjoyed something of a resurgence in popularity amongst the predominantly Sunni "Arab street," due to its support for Hezbollah during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's vehement opposition to the United States and call for the annihilation of Israel. General Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization of PakistanZia-ul-Haq's Islamization of Pakistan was a socio-political process that was implemented in the country by the ruling military regime, beginning in the late 1970s and continuing throughout the 1980s. On December 2, 1978, the then-President of Pakistan General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq officially called for an Islamic system to be imposed in its totality. The implementation of sharia law, however, came about only in small steps. The Deobandi MovementIn India, the Deobandi movement developed as a reaction to British actions against Muslims and the influence of Sayed Ahmad Khan, who advocated the Westernization of Islam. Named after the town of Deoband, where it originated, the movement expanded under the guidance of Maulana Qasim Nanotwi on the traditional methods of Fiqh (jurisprudence), Aqidah (theology). Now the foremost movement of traditional Islamic thought in the subcontinent, it lead to the establishment of many Madrasahs throughout India, Pakistan, Bangladesh. Deobandi thought is defined foremost by its adherence to the Hanafi Fiqh (and to a lesser extent, the Shafi'i Fiqh) and by its emphasis on Tasawwuf (Spiritual reformation and purification). The 'Deobandi' identity was initially thought important as a way of representing traditional Islamic jurisprudence and the purity of Aqidah from the increasing number of movements in India at the time that either aimed to Westernize Islam or introduce unorthodox beliefs such as grave-worshipping. In modern and more global times, use of this differentiation is given less and less importance with the view that with most differences of opinion with other schools of thought being arguing semantics, unity among Muslims is paramount. Though Deobandi thought has traditionally and continues to focus on purity of the heart, knowledge of Islamic tenets and jurisprudence and social cohesion and harmony, it doesn't in any way renounce resistance against occupation or oppression. Darul Uloom Deoband was in fact the strongest voice of opposition in India to British-backed movements that attempted to renounce the struggle against British occupation, with its leaders and students actively engaged in the military resistance to the occupation. Islamic Jihad movementsWhile Qutb's ideas became increasingly radical during his imprisonment prior to his execution in 1966, the leadership of the Brotherhood, led by Hasan al-Hudaybi, remained moderate and interested in political negotiation and activism. Fringe or splinter movements, however, did develop and pursued a more radical direction, perhaps inspired by final writings of Qutb in the mid-1960s (e.g. "Milestones," aka Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq). By the 1970s, the Brotherhood renounced violence as a means to their goals. The path of violence and military struggle was however taken up by such movements as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization, responsible for the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. Unlike earlier anti-colonial movements, Egyptian Islamic Jihad focused its efforts on "apostate" leaders of Muslim states, or those leaders who held secular leanings or introduced or promoted Western/foreign ideas and practices into Islamic societies. Their views were outlined in a pamphlet written by Muhammad Abd al-Salaam Farag, in which he states: "…there is no doubt that the first battlefield for jihad is the extermination of these infidel leaders and to replace them by a complete Islamic Order…" Salafism/WahhabismAn influential strain of Muslim thought came from the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia. The Wahhabists, who emerged in the 18th century led by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, also believed that it was necessary to live according to the strict dictates of Islam, which they interpreted to mean living in the manner that the prophet Muhammad and his followers had lived in during the seventh century in Medina. Consequently they were opposed to many religious innovations such as grave worshiping. They were also opposed to the many superstitions that were beginning to spread in Arabia such as the wearing of talismans etc. When King Abdul Aziz al-Saud founded Saudi Arabia, he brought the Wahhabists into power with him. With Saud's rise to prominence, Wahhabism spread, especially following the 1973 oil embargo and the glut of oil wealth that resulted for Saudi Arabia. The Wahhabists were proselytizers and made use of their wealth to spread their interpretation of Islam. Some Salafis are against modern political Islamism, and many have sharply criticized Islamist figures such as Sayed Qutb [9] [10], Abu A`la Maududi [11] [12] and Usamah bin Laden [13]. They have also been critical of Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood [14], and the methods they use, such as the political party system [15], and terrorism. [16] [17] Recent historyIslamism went through its major political and philosophical developments in the early part of the twentieth century, but it was not until the 1980s that it became active in an international arena and rose to great prominence in the 1990s. The reasons for the rise of Islamism during this period are still disputed. The ideologies that had dominated the Middle East since decolonization such as Ba'athism, Arab Socialism, and Arab Nationalism had, by 1980, failed to attain the economic and political goals expected of them. By the late 1980s the distinct Shi'ite version of political Islam had been drained of its vigour in the Iran-Iraq War. During the conflict against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, many Islamists came together to fight what they saw as an atheist invading force and were heavily funded by the United States. In Pakistan, military dictators brought into power through coups (especially Zia-ul-Haq) exploited Islamist sentiments to consolidate their power, bringing Islamist political parties into prominence and all but destroying the traditional secularism that stemmed from the secular stance of the Muslim League and its leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah, founder of Pakistan. In his book Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam Gilles Kepel argues that the central importance of Islamism in the 1990s was a product of the Gulf War. Prior to 1990 organized political Islam had been mostly associated with Saudi Arabia, a nation founded on Wahhabism and an ally of Islamist groups in Egypt and in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia, as a close ally of the West and with a strong interest in regional stability, played an important restraining role on Islamist groups. The Shi'ite clerics in Iran had long argued that Saudi Arabia was an apostate state, a puppet of the West that espoused a corrupted Islam.[28] During the 1980s these accusations had little effect, largely because of their Shi'ite origin. However, Kepel argues that when Saddam Hussein turned on his former allies, he embraced this rhetoric, arguing that Saudi Arabia had betrayed its duty to protect the holiest sites of Islam. Kepel states that Saddam Hussein embraced Islamic rhetoric and trappings and tried to draw leading scholars and activists to his camp. Some of the main Islamist groups remained loyal to Saudi Arabia, but a number such as parts of the Muslim Brotherhood and Afghani mujahideen aligned themselves with Saddam. Far more groups declared themselves neutral in the struggle. According to Kepel the rapid defeat of Saddam did not end this rift. As Saddam had likely predicted Saudi Arabia had found itself in a severe dilemma, the only way to counter the Iraqi threat was to seek help from the west, which would immediately confirm the Iraqi allegations of Saudi Arabia being a friend to the west. To ensure the regime's survival Saudi Arabia accepted a massive western presence in the country and de facto cooperation with Israel causing great offense to many in Islamist circles. After the war, Saudi Arabia launched a two-pronged strategy to restore its security and leadership in Islamist circles. Those Islamist groups who refused to return under the Saudi umbrella were persecuted and any Islamists who had criticized Saudi regime were arrested or forced into exile, with most going to London. At the same time, Saudi oil money began to flow freely to those Islamist groups who continued to work with the kingdom. Islamist madrassas around the world saw their funding greatly increased. More covertly, Saudi money began to fund more violent Islamist groups in areas such as Bosnia and the former Soviet Union. Saudi Arabia's western allies mostly looked the other way — seeing the survival of their crucial ally as more important than the problem of more money and resources flowing to Islamist groups.[citation needed] In the 1990s, Islamist conflicts erupted around the world in areas such as Algeria, the Palestinian territories, Sudan, and Nigeria. In 1995 a series of terrorist attacks were launched against France. The most important development was the rise to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 1996. In the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan a number of anti-Saudi and anti-Western Islamist groups found refuge.[citation needed] Significantly, Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi influenced by Wahhabism and the writings of Sayed Qutb, joined forces with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad under Ayman al-Zawahiri to form what is now called al-Qaeda. A considerable effort has been made to fight Western targets, especially the United States. The United States, in particular, was made a subject of Islamist fire because of its support for Israel, its presence on Saudi Arabian soil, what Islamists regard as its aggression against Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan, and its support of the regimes Islamists oppose. In addition, some Islamists have concentrated their activity against Israel, and nearly all Islamists view Israel with hostility. Osama bin Laden, at least, believes that this is of necessity due to historical conflict between Muslims and Jews, and considers there to be a Jewish/American alliance against Islam. There is some debate as to how influential Islamist movements remain. Some scholars assert that Islamism is a fringe movement that is dying, following the clear failures of Islamist regimes like the regime in Sudan, the Habitué's Saudi regime and the Deobandi Taliban to improve the lot of Muslims. However, others (such as Ahmed Rashid) feel that the Islamists still command considerable support and cite the fact that Islamists in Pakistan and Egypt regularly poll 10 to 30 percent in electoral polls, despite the fact they are prosecuted and that many believe the polls are rigged against them. An alternative direction has been taken by many Islamists in Turkey, where the Islamist movement split into reformist and traditionalist wings in 2001. The reformists formed the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (Ak Party), which gained an overall majority in the Turkish parliament in 2002, and has sought to balance Islamic values with the requirements of a secular and democratic political system. Some in the Justice and Development Party see the Christian Democrat parties of Western Europe as a model, which has led some to question whether it is a genuinely Islamist movement. Islamism and modern political theoryThe development of modern Islamism was also both a reaction to and influenced by the other ideologies of the modern world. Modern Islamism began in the colonial period, and it was overtly anti-imperialist. It was also opposed to the local elites who wanted independence, but who also supported adopting western liberal ideals. Writers like the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb and the Pakistani Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi saw western style individualism as counter to centuries of tradition, and also as inevitably leading to a debauched and licentious society. In the years after independence, the most important ideological current in the Muslim world was nationalism, socialism and communism. This influenced Islamism in two ways. Much Islamist thought and writing during this era was directly addressed to countering Marxism. For instance, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr's main works are detailed critiques of Marxism, paying much less attention to capitalism and liberalism. Another option was to try to integrate socialism and Islamism. This was most notably done by Ali Shariati. At several points, Islamist and leftist groups found common cause and several organizations, such as the People's Mujahedin of Iran and Islamic Socialist Front in Syria, were both overtly Marxist and overtly Islamist. While most Islamists reject Marxism, the influence of socialist ideologies during the formative period of modern Islamism means that Islamist works continue to be infused with Marxist language and concepts. For instance, Qutb's view of an elite vanguard to lead an Islamic revolution is borrowed directly from Lenin's Vanguard of the Proletariat. During the 1930s, a number of fascistic groups arose in the Middle East. Some, such as the SSNP and the Kataeb Party, were mostly supported by Christians and other minority groups; others, such as the Egyptian Misr al-Fatat, were mainly Sunni Arab. The fascist method of seizing power did inspire Islamist Hassan al-Banna, who founded organizations directly based on the Brownshirts and Blackshirts to try and seize power.[29] This method proved ineffective, and most Islamists have since used the cell based structure commonly used by leftist groups. Ideologically there is little evidence that fascism had much influence on the development of Islamism. See also
Further reading
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