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The Attack on Pearl Harbor or Bombing of Pearl Harbor was a surprise attack on the United States naval base on Pearl Harbor, Oahu, Hawaii. It was launched on the morning of Sunday, December 7, 1941 (Hawaii time) by the Empire of Japan's 1st Air Fleet against the U.S. Pacific Fleet and other US armed forces stationed at the harbor and also on the other side of Oahu. The attack spurred the U.S. into entering World War II. American casualties were 2403 dead and 1178 wounded, one of the worst losses in U.S. history (but still comparatively light in comparison to what might have been, in the opinion of several observers[1]) 5 older[2] battleships, 3 destroyers, 3 cruisers, and 188 planes (mostly obsolescent P-40s or obsolete P-36s[3]) were destroyed. By contrast, Japan's losses were 64 dead, 1 captured, 29 planes, and 5 midget submarines. When U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt addressed the shocked American people, he called it "a date which will live in infamy." The date is still noted every year in the U.S. The attack on Pearl Harbor was the first time the United States was ever attacked by another country since the War of 1812 and the Burning of Washington from 1812-1815 during the Napoleonic Wars.
Background
IndustrializationAfter the Meiji Restoration, which replaced the previous government among other wide-sweeping effects, the Empire of Japan embarked on a rapid economic, political, and military expansion to achieve parity with the European and North American countries in terms of power. Part of this strategy included extending territorial and economic control to increase access to populations, bases, and natural resources which were thought needed because of a lack of abundant resource in the Japanese home islands. That rapid industrialization demanded more resources than were available. In order to match Western powers, Japan rapidly developed its military and economy under the slogan "National Wealth and Military Strength." Military personnel played an increasing role in policy and then in government, especially after the early years of the 20th century. Assassination, attempted coup, and internal pressure were some of the tactics used by extreme elements in the military and elsewhere in Japanese society. Eventually, Generals Hideki Tojo and Kuniaki Koiso became Prime Ministers. From about 1910 through the 1930s, Japan became extensively militarized, in particular building a large and modern navy, the third largest in the world at the time, and a large and modern army. ExpansionJapan looked outward for resources to support its power. Japan's expansionist policy directly caused wars with other countries, initially with Korea, China and Russia, ranging from deliberate attack (e.g., the Panay incident), war (against Russia and China around 1900, as part of WWI, and against China again beginning in the early 30s), to diplomatic reactions (leaving the League of Nations, threatening postures over various incidents, ...) and trade restrictions (mostly by others in reaction). The largest were the First Sino-Japanese War with China in 1894, in which Japan took control of Taiwan, and the Russo-Japanese War with Russia in 1904, by which Japan gained territory in and around China, including the Korean peninsula. After World War I, the League of Nations awarded Japan custody of most of Imperial Germany's possessions and colonies in East Asia and the Pacific. In 1931, Japan imposed the puppet state of Manchukuo on eastern Manchuria by force. And starting in 1937, Japan escalated its long-simmering conflict with mainland China by the staged incident at the Marco Polo Bridge, starting the Second Sino-Japanese War. CondemnationThe attacks against China were condemned by the League of Nations, the U.S., the UK, Australia, and the Netherlands. All but the League had territorial interests in Southeast Asia or the Philippines. These nations had already become aware of Japanese military power and willingness to use it, for instance after the Russo-Japanese war when almost all of the Russian Fleet was destroyed. In response to diplomatic pressures there, Japan resigned from the League of Nations. Then in July 1939, the U.S. terminated the 1911 U.S.-Japan commercial treaty, an action which showed official disapproval and, more concretely, allowed the U.S. to impose trade restrictions as an additional pressure measure. Nevertheless, Japan continued the war in China and signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Nazi Germany, which formally ended World War I hostilities between the two countries and declared common interests. In 1940, Japan also signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Fascist Italy forming the Axis Powers.
WarWith the Hull note of November 26, 1941, Japan's leaders decided not to cancel the Pearl Harbor attack, in planning for 10 months and in serious training for most of the year. In fact, the attack had already been finally approved at the second Imperial Conference to consider it, in September. The fleet had been assembling in the Kuriles, and indeed sailed the day the Hull note was sent. U.S. and UK demands to back down from its actions in China and surrounding areas were perhaps seen as meaning a loss of international prestige for Japan, "losing face," losing national pride, losing everything gained in the Second Sino-Japanese war, losing access to oil, and losing future possibilities, despite the heavy investments in the military. The economy and policy of Japan already had become war-focused and there was little effective opposition to militarization in the leadership. As planned, the force would execute a pre-emptive strike to be in a better position as war began. On September 4, 1941, at the second of two Imperial Conferences concerning an attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Cabinet met in the presence of the Emperor to consider the attack plans prepared by Imperial General Headquarters, and officially declared the intent for war. It was decided:
Japanese strategy and plansImage:Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.jpg Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of the Combined Fleet and the architect and implementer at the throne. In preparation for the expected war, planning began in early 1941 for a Pearl Harbor attack. For the next several months, planning, training, weapons development, espionage, and coordination with other plans to invade British and Dutch colonies to the South occupied much of the Japanese military's time and attention. The decision to attack, unless the U.S. agreed with the Japanese positions in China, Indochina, and elsewhere, was finalized in September 1941 at the second of the two Imperial Conferences considering. Preparations for attacks against Malaya, the Philippines, and assorted Pacific islands were ready by the planned date of early December.[6] Pearl Harbor attack planning was a part of the Japanese expectation the U.S. would be inevitably drawn into the war after a Japanese attack against Malaya and Singapore.[7] The intent of a pre-emptive strike on Pearl Harbor was to neutralize American naval power in the Pacific, if only temporarily. After approval at the first Imperial Conference such an attack was incorporated into a theater-wide, simultaneous coordinated attack against several different countries, to be carried out if the differences with the United States could not be resolved to Japan's satisfaction. Thus, the future of Imperial Japan was judged to depend on successfully dealing with the Pacific Fleet. The difficulties of such an attack were twofold. First, the Pacific Fleet was a formidable force, and would not be easy to defeat or to surprise. Second, for aerial attack, Pearl Harbor's shallow waters made using conventional air-dropped torpedoes ineffective. On the other hand, Hawaii's isolation meant a successful surprise attack could not be blocked or quickly countered by forces from the continental U.S. Strategic conceptsSeveral Japanese naval officers had been impressed by British Admiral Andrew Cunningham's Operation JUDGEMENT, in which 20 obsolete Fairey Swordfish biplanes, launched from aircraft carriers far from the main British base at Alexandria, disabled half the Italian fleet. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto dispatched a naval delegation to Italy, which concluded that a larger and better-supported version of Cunningham's strike could force the U.S. Pacific Fleet to retreat to bases in California, thus giving Japan the time and space thought necessary to erect a "barrier" defense to protect Japanese control of the resources (e.g., oil) of Southeast Asia and the Dutch East Indies. Most importantly, the delegation returned to Japan with information about the shallow running torpedoes Cunningham's engineers had devised. Some Japanese strategists may also have been influenced by U.S. Admiral Harry Yarnell's performance in the 1932 joint Army-Navy exercises, which assumed an invasion of Hawaiʻi. Yarnell, as commander of the attacking force, placed his carriers northwest of Oʻahu in rough weather and simulated an air attack on the morning of Sunday, February 7, 1932. The exercise's umpires noted Yarnell's aircraft were able to inflict serious "damage" on the defenders, who for 24 hours after the attack were unable to locate his fleet. Yarnell's tactic was dismissed as impractical. Primarily, Yamamoto’s idea for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was inspired by his hero, Fleet Admiral Marquis Tōgō Heihachirō, who in 1904 had, without declaring war, attacked the Second Russian Pacific Squadron at the Battle of Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War. The Russians lost two battleships and several cruisers, and never fully recovered. A year later, a young Ensign Yamamoto was injured in the Battle of Tsushima, where the Japanese destroyed almost the entire Russian fleet.[8] Yamamoto's placing main emphasis on battleships was in keeping with the Mahanian doctrine shared by all major navies during this period, including the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy,[9] which held dominance at sea depended on defeating the enemy fleet, achieved by destroying the battleship force (the "battle line").[10] Prewar, Japan expected to meet the U.S. Battle Force in a "decisive battle area" around Okinawa, an expectation in startling symmetry with the U.S.'s War Plan Orange.]],[11] Intelligence and reconnaissanceOn February 3, 1940, Yamamoto briefed Captain Kanji Ogawa of Naval Intelligence on the potential attack plan, asking him to start intelligence gathering on Pearl Harbor. Ogawa already had spies in Hawaii, including Japanese Consular officials with an intelligence remit, and he arranged for help from a German (and perhaps from family members as well) already living in Hawaii who was an Abwehr agent. None had been providing much militarily useful information. He planned to add 29-year-old Ensign Takeo Yoshikawa. By the spring of 1941, Yamamoto officially made a request for additional Hawaiian intelligence, and Yoshikawa boarded the liner Nitta-maru at Yokohama. He had grown his hair longer than military length, and assumed the cover name Tadashi Morimura.[12] Yoshikawa began gathering intelligence in earnest by taking auto trips around the main islands, and toured Oahu in a small plane, posing as a tourist. He visited Pearl Harbor frequently, sketching the harbor and location of ships from the crest of a hill. Once, he gained access to Hickam Field in a taxi, memorizing the number of visible planes, pilots, hangars, barracks and soldiers. He was also able to discover that Sunday was the day of the week on which the largest number of ships were likely to be in harbor, that PBY patrol planes went out every morning and evening, and that there was an antisubmarine net in the mouth of the harbor.[13] Information was returned to Japan in coded form in Consular communications, and by direct delivery to intelligence officers aboard Japanese ships calling at Hawaii by consulate staff. Early planningImage:Minoru Genda.jpg Major General Minoru Genda planned the attack.
In early 1941, Combined Fleet Commander-in-Chief Yamamoto began considering an attack on Pearl Harbor as a preemptive attack in the event of war. After some conflict with Naval General Headquarters and threatening to resign, he was finally authorized to create the Carrier Striking Task Force, and assigned Minoru Genda to develop the actual attack plan. Genda's plan stressed that surprise would be essential, given the expected balance of forces. Yamamoto obtained permission to begin formal planning and training exercises for the proposed attack. By April 1941, the Pearl Harbor plan became known as Operation Z,[citation needed] after the famous Z signal given by Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō at the Battle of Tsushima: On this one battle rests the fate of our nation. Let every man do his utmost.[14] Over the summer, pilots trained in earnest on the Japanese island of Kyūshū. Captain Genda chose Kagoshima City for a training area because its geography and infrastructure presented most of the same problems torpedo bombers would face at Pearl Harbor. In training, each crew would fly over the 5000-foot (1500m) mountain behind Kagoshima, dive down into the city, dodging buildings and smokestacks before dropping to an altitude of 25 feet (7m) at the piers. Bombardiers would release a torpedo at a breakwater some 300 yards (270m) away.[15] Yet even skimming the water would not solve the problem of torpedoes bottoming in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor. Japan created and tested modifications allowing successful shallow water drops. The effort resulted in a heavily modified version of the Type 91 torpedo which inflicted most of the ship damage during the attack. Japanese weapons technicians also produced special armor-piercing bombs by fitting fins and release shackles to 14 and 16 inch (356 and 406 mm) naval shells. These were able to penetrate the armored decks of battleships and cruisers. On a beach in Kagoshima Bay, Lieutenant Heijiro Abe, commander of ten high-level bombers, used lime to draw an outline of a battleship in the sand. He ordered his men to drop dummy bombs on it. Only he knew it was the outline of the battleship California.[16] Japanese navy orders, directives and organizationOn December 1, 1941 Fleet Admiral and General Staff Osami Nagano gave a verbal directive to Yamamoto, declaring:
The Kido Butai's (Striking Force) objective was to
Upon completion, the force was to return to Japan, re-equip, and re-deploy for "Second Period Operations". Finally, Order number 9, issued on 1 December 1941 by Osami Nagano commanded Yamamoto to
Carrier Strike Task Force (Kido Butai)On November 26 1941, the carrier battle group commanded by Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo (six aircraft carriers, two battleships, three cruisers, nine destroyers, 23 fleet submarines, five midget submarines, 441 planes, and eight oilers) left Hitokappu Wan in the Kuril Islands bound for Hawaiʻi under strict radio silence. It was the most powerful carrier force with the greatest air power in the history of naval warfare [2]. Image:Mitsubishi Zero-Yasukuni.jpg Mitsubishi A6M5 Type 0. The aircraft carriers were Akagi (flag), Kaga, Shōkaku, Zuikaku, and the newest, Sōryū and Hiryū. Two fast battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 9 destroyers, and 3 fleet submarines provided escort for the task force. The carriers had a total of 423[citation needed] planes, including Mitsubishi A6M Type 0 fighters (Allied codename "Zeke", commonly called "Zero"), Nakajima B5N Type 97 torpedo bombers (Allied codename "Kate"), and Aichi D3A Type 99 dive bombers (Allied codename "Val"). In addition, the Advanced Expeditionary Force included 20 fleet submarines and five two-man Ko-hyoteki-class midget submarines which were to gather intelligence and sink U.S. vessels attempting to flee Pearl Harbor during or soon after the attack. Order of battleImage:Gunichi Mikawa.jpg Mikawa Gunichi Image:TamonYamaguchi.jpg Tamon Yamaguchi Below is the shortened Imperial Japanese Navy's order of battle and excluding the posthumous promotions:
United States' preparednessImage:Husband Kimmel.jpg Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Image:Battleship row.jpg Battleship Row presented an attractive concentration of targets. U.S. civil and military intelligence had, amongst them, good information suggesting additional Japanese aggression throughout the summer and fall before the attack. None of it then specifically indicated an attack against Pearl Harbor, nor has any been identified since. Public press reports during summer and fall, including Hawaiian newspapers, contained extensive reports on the growing tension in the Pacific. Late in November, all Pacific commands, including both the Navy and Army in Hawaii, were separately and explicitly warned war with Japan was expected in the very near future, probably with attacks in the Far East: the Philippines, Việt Nam, or Russia. The warnings were not specific to any area, noting only that war with Japan was to be expected in the immediate short term and that all commands should act accordingly. Had any of these warnings produced an active alert status in Hawaii, the attack would likely have been resisted more effectively, and perhaps might have caused less death and damage. On the other hand, recall of men on shore leave to the ships in harbor might have led to still more being casualties from bombs and torpedoes, or trapped in capsized ships by shut watertight doors (as the attack alert status have required).[17] When the attack actually arrived, Pearl Harbor was effectively unprepared: anti-aircraft weapons not manned, most ammunition locked down, anti-submarine measures not implemented (e.g., no torpedo nets in the Harbor), combat air patrol not flying, available scouting aircraft not in the air at first light, Air Corps aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip to reduce sabotage risks not to be ready to fly at first warning, and so on. By 1941, U.S. signals intelligence, through the Army's Signal Intelligence Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence's OP-20-G, had intercepted and decrypted considerable Japanese diplomatic and naval cipher traffic, though none of those actually decrypted carried significant tactical military information about Japanese plans in 1940-41. Decryption and distribution of this intelligence, including such decrypts as were available, was capricious and sporadic, and can be blamed in part on lack of manpower. At best, the information was fragmentary, contradictory, or poorly distributed, and was almost entirely raw, without supporting analysis. It was also incompletely understood by decision makers. Nothing in it pointed directly to an attack at Pearl Harbor, and a lack of awareness of Imperial Navy capabilities led to a widespread underlying belief Pearl Harbor was safely out of harm's way. Only one message from the Hawaiian Japanese consulate (sent on 6 December 1941), in a low level consular cipher, included mention of an attack at Pearl; it was not decrypted until 8 December 1941.[18]) Image:Walter Short.jpg Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, commanding general of the Army post at Pearl Harbor. In 1924, General William L. Mitchell produced a 324 page report warning future wars (including with Japan) would include a new role for aircraft, against existing ships and facilities. He even discussed the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. He was essentially ignored. Navy Secretary Knox had also appreciated the possibility of an attack at Pearl in a written analysis shortly after taking office. American commanders had also been warned that tests demonstrated shallow-water aerial torpedo launches were possible, but no one in charge in Hawaii fully appreciated any of this. A war game surprise attack against Pearl Harbor in 1932 had been judged a success and to have caused considerable damage. Nevertheless, because it believed Pearl Harbor had natural defenses against torpedo attack (e.g., the shallow water), the Navy did not deploy torpedo nets or baffles, which were judged an interference with ordinary operations. And as a result of limited numbers of long-range aircraft (including Army Air Corps bombers, The AAC being responsible for search by a prewar arrangement), reconnaissance patrols were not being made as often or as far out as required for adequate coverage against possible surprise attack; they improved considerably, with fewer planes, after the attack. The Navy had 16 operational PBYs long range aircraft.[citation needed] Hawaii was low on the priority list for the B-17s finally becoming available for the Pacific, largely because General MacArthur in the Philippines was successfully demanding as many as could be made available to the Pacific. At the time of the attack, Army and Navy air defense were both on training status rather than operational alert. There was also confusion about the Army's readiness status as General Short had changed the alert level designations without clearly informing Washington. Most of the Army's mobile anti-aircraft guns were secured, with ammunition locked down in armories. To avoid upsetting property owners, and in keeping with Washington's admonition not to alarm civil populations (e.g., in the late November war warning messages from the Navy and War Departments), guns were not dispersed around Pearl Harbor (i.e., on private property). Additionally, aircraft were parked on airfields to lessen risk from sabotage, not in anticipation of air attack, in keeping with Short's (uncontradicted) interpretation of the war warnings. Breaking off negotiationsImage:PearlHarborCarrierChart.jpg Carrier Striking Task Force two-way route. In the days before the attack, a long 14-part message was sent to the Embassy from the Foreign Office in Tokyo (encrypted with the Type 97 cryptographic machine, in a cipher named PURPLE by U.S. cryptanalysts), with instructions to deliver it to Secretary of State Cordell Hull at 1 p.m. Washington time. The last part arrived late Saturday night (Washington time) but, because of decryption and typing delays, and because Tokyo had neglected to stress the crucial necessity to deliver it on time, Embassy personnel failed to deliver the message at the specified time. The message, breaking off negotiations, was delivered to Secretary Hull several hours after the Pearl Harbor attack: Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia ... Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost. The United States had decrypted the 14th part of the final message well before the Japanese Embassy managed to, and long before the Embassy managed a fair typed copy. The final part, with its instruction for the time of delivery, prompted General George Marshall to send that morning's notorious warning message to Hawaii. There were delays because General Marshall couldn't be found (he was out for a morning horseback ride), trouble with the Army's long distance communication system, a decision not to use the Navy's parallel facilities despite an offer to permit it, and various troubles during its travels over commercial cable facilities (somehow its "urgent" marking was misplaced, adding additional hours to its travel time). It was actually delivered to Gen. Walter Short, by a young Japanese-American cycle messenger, several hours after the attack had ended. Japanese records, admitted into evidence during Congressional hearings on the attack after the War, established that the Japanese government had not even written a declaration of war until after hearing of the successful attack. The two-line declaration of war was finally delivered to U.S. Ambassador Grew in Tokyo about 10 hours after the attack was over. He was allowed to transmit it to the United States where it was received late Monday afternoon (Washington time). AttackJapanese tactics for attackImage:Attack on Pearl Harbor Japanese planes prepare.jpg Aichi D3A "Val" dive bombers preparing to take off. The task force was ordered (Order Number 7) to engage the enemy fleet if encountered[3]. The whole operation was obviously meant to be conducted in secret. In fact, a commercial freighter had scouted the proposed route earlier in the year. Yamamoto and senior Navy staff intended there be three waves of attack,[citation needed] but Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo decided to break off after the second. There were also supporting submarines and midget submarines assigned to engage U.S. ships should they succeed in leaving the harbor. The location of the attack force remained unknown to the U.S. until after the Japanese ships were already returning to the Eastern Pacific; they were not located after the attack, in part because such searches as were organized were conducted south of Oahu despite aircraft and radar reports of the attacking force that morning. (This was partially due to direction finding mistakenly placing searchers on a reciprocal bearing.[19]) The total number of planes involved in the attack was 350.[citation needed] 91[citation needed] were engaged in protection of aircraft carriers and other ships during the attack.[20] The strike launched 200 nautical miles (370km) north of Oahu.[4] On the home leg, the task force was instructed to counter-attack should American forces locate and engage them, and re-routed south to the friendly base in the Marshall Islands.[5] Here is the general outline for the aerial attack:
Pre-attack reconnaissanceOn December 5, Yoshikawa went on his final “sightseeing” flight over Pearl Harbor in a small Piper Cub.[citation needed] He cabled Tokyo there were 8 battleships,[21] 3 light cruisers, and 16 destroyers in the harbor.[22] Also, two Aichi E12A Type 0 float scouts (Allied codename "Jake"), one each from Tone and Chikuma (Mikuma's Cruiser Division 8) secretly scouted the Lahaina Road anchorage and Pearl Harbor[23] for the Pacific Fleet. First wave attack unitsThe first wave of attack consisted of 49 "Kate" level bombers, 51 "Val" dive bombers, 40 "Kate" torpedo bombers and 43 "Zeke" fighters (a total of 183), launched north of Oahu, commanded by Captain Mitsuo Fuchida. This wave included
The first attack wave divided into six formations with one directed to Wheeler Field. Each of the aerial waves started with the bombers and ended with the fighters to deter pursuit. Image:Japanesecrewmen.jpg Crewmen aboard Shokaku farewelling to the planes taking off. Second wave attack unitsThe second wave consisted of 54 level bombers, 78 dive bombers, and 35 fighters (a total of 167), launched from much the same location, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki. This wave was composed of
The second wave was divided into four formations with one formation tasked to Kāneʻohe Nava | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
