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Prelude to the InvasionPrior to the invasion, the United States' official position was that Iraq was in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 regarding weapons of mass destruction and had to be disarmed by force.[8] In early 2003, the United States, United Kingdom, and Spain proposed another UN Resolution on Iraq, which they called the "eighteenth resolution," to give Iraq a deadline to comply with previous resolutions before possible military intervention. This proposed resolution was subsequently withdrawn by the United States and its allies before it came to a vote because not enough countries would have supported it. NATO members France and Germany, together with Russia, were opposed to military intervention in Iraq on the grounds that it would be very risky, in terms of security, for the international community, and defended a diplomatic process of disarmament.[9][10] On January 20, 2003, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin declared "...we believe that military intervention would be the worst solution." Despite the lack of a majority in the 15-member UN Security Council who would have voted for the new resolution, the US stated that they withdrew the resolution after France, Russia, and later China all signaled that they would use their Security Council veto power against any resolution that would include an ultimatum allowing the use of force against Iraq. US Ambassador to the UN John Negroponte said, "We regret that in the face of an explicit threat to veto, the vote-counting became a secondary consideration."[3] On March 20, 2003, the invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies began, without UN support. Image:Prewar-meeting.jpg President Bush meets with his top advisors on March 19, 2003 just before the invasion began. Political and diplomatic aspectsSince the conclusion of the Gulf War of 1991, Iraq's relations with the UN, the U.S., and the UK remained poor. In the absence of a Security Council consensus that Iraq had fully complied with the terms of the Persian Gulf War ceasefire, both the UN and the U.S. enforced numerous economic sanctions against Iraq (see, Iraq sanctions) throughout the Clinton administration. The U.S. and the UK patrolled Iraqi airspace to enforce Iraqi no-fly zones that they had declared to protect Kurds in northern Iraq and Shi'ites in the south. The no-fly zone was contested however by Iraqi military helicopters and planes on numerous occasions.[11][12] The United States Congress also passed the "Iraq Liberation Act" in October 1998 after Iraq had terminated its cooperation with the U.N. in August. The act provided $97 million for Iraqi "democratic opposition organizations" in order to "establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq."[13] This contrasted with the terms set out in U.N. Resolution 687,[14] all of which related to weapons and weapons programs, and made no mention of regime change. Weapons inspectors had been used to gather information on Iraq's WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) program and to enforce the terms of the 1991 cease fire, which forbade Iraq from developing WMD. The information was used in targeting decisions during Operation Desert Fox, a U.S. and UK bombardment of Iraq in December 1998 which was precipitated by lack of cooperation between Iraq and the UN weapon inspections team.[15][16]
The United States Republican Party's campaign platform in the U.S. presidential election, 2000 called for "full implementation" of the Iraq Liberation Act and removal of Saddam Hussein with a focus on rebuilding a coalition, tougher sanctions, reinstating inspections, and support for the pro-democracy, opposition exile group, Iraqi National Congress then headed by Ahmed Chalabi.[17] Upon the election of George W. Bush as president, according to former treasury secretary Paul O'Neill, an attack was planned since the inauguration, and the first security council meeting discussed plans on invasion of the country. O'Neill later clarified that these discussions were part of a continuation of foreign policy first put into place by the Clinton Administration.[18] Notes from aides who were with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in the National Military Command Center one year later, on the day of the September 11, 2001 attacks, reflect that he wanted, "best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit Saddam Hussein at same time. Not only Osama bin Laden." The notes also quote him as saying, "Go massive", and "Sweep it all up. Things related and not."[19] Shortly thereafter, the Bush administration announced a War on Terrorism, accompanied by the doctrine of 'pre-emptive' military action, termed the Bush doctrine. From the 1990s, U.S. officials have constantly voiced concerns about ties between the government of Saddam Hussein and terrorist activities, notably in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Through the Palestinian Arab Liberation Front (PALF), Saddam had offered $10,000 USD for families of "civilians killed during Israeli military operations" and, $25,000 USD for "families of suicide bombers."[20] In 2002, the Iraq disarmament crisis arose primarily as a diplomatic situation. The Bush administration waited until September 2002 to call for action, with White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card saying "From a marketing point of view, you don't introduce new products in August."[21] In October 2002, with the "Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq", the United States Congress granted Bush the authority to "use any means necessary" against Iraq, based on available intelligence and Bush Administration statements to Congress and the public, that Iraq wished to develop and possess weapons of mass destruction. The joint resolution allowed the President of the United States to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq." In November 2002, United Nations actions regarding Iraq culminated in the unanimous passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and the resumption of weapons inspections. Force was not authorized by resolution 1441 itself, as the language of the resolution mentioned "serious consequences", which the majority of Security Council members argued did not include the use of force to overthrow the government; however the threat of force, as cultivated by the Bush administration, was prominent at the time of the vote. Both the U.S. ambassador to the UN, John Negroponte, and the UK ambassador Jeremy Greenstock, in promoting Resolution 1441, had given assurances that it provided no "automaticity", no "hidden triggers", no step to invasion without consultation of the Security Council.[22] Such consultation was forestalled by the U.S. and UK's abandonment of the Security Council procedure and their invasion of Iraq. The stated cause by the United Kingdom to forego further UN resolutions was notice supplied by France that they would block any further Security Council resolutions on Iraq.[23] Negroponte was noted as saying "one way or another, Mr. President, Iraq will be disarmed. If the Security Council fails to act decisively in the event of a further Iraqi violation, this resolution does not constrain any member state from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq, or to enforce relevant U.N. resolutions and protect world peace and security." The United States also began preparations for an invasion of Iraq, with a host of diplomatic, public relations, and military preparations. In his March 17, 2003 address to the nation, Bush demanded Hussein and his two sons Uday and Qusay to surrender and leave Iraq, giving them a 48-hour deadline.[24] This demand was reportedly rejected.[25] Iraq maintained that it had disarmed as required. The UN weapons inspectors (UNMOVIC) headed by Hans Blix, who were sent by the UN Security Council pursuant to Resolution 1441, requested more time to complete their report on whether Iraq had complied with its obligation to disarm (UN Security Council Resolution 1441; UNMOVIC). The International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA reported a level of compliance by Iraq with the disarmament requirements (UN Security Council Resolution 1441; IAEA) Hans Blix went on to state the Iraqi government may have been hoping to restart production once sanctions were lifted and inspectors left the country, as speculated by senior Iraqi officials and a prominent defector, Gen. Hussein Kamel.[26] The attempt of the United Kingdom and the United States to obtain a further Resolution authorizing force failed. In 2006, the Iraq Study Group reported that "while a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991." The degraded chemical munitions which had been collected from around the country since the invasion began came to the public's attention in 2006 when Congressman Rick Santorum referred to them in a press conference, claiming that the United States had discovered weapons of mass destruction in Iraq after all. He cited a declassified summary of a report[27] mentioning that "approximately 500 weapons munitions which contain degraded mustard or sarin nerve agent" had been collected in groups of one or two from around the country since the invasion.[28] The Washington Post reported that ever since the abandoned shells had begun to be found, "neither the military nor the White House nor the CIA considered the shells to be evidence of what was alleged by the Bush administration to be a current Iraqi program to make chemical, biological and nuclear weapons."[29] The invasion is claimed to have been a contributing factor to Muammar al-Gaddafi's decision to disclose and give up his nascent nuclear program.[30] However, the existence of such a weapons program is in doubt,[31] and some suspect that it suited all involved to exaggerate - or even invent - both the threat posed by the alleged program, and the sacrifice made in abandoning it. As a response to the imminent invasion, the February 15, 2003 anti-war protest were held—the largest of their kind since the Vietnam war. Between six and ten million people in over 60 countries around the world participated.[32] The invasion of Iraq did not have the support of the UN, unlike the invasion of Afghanistan. RationaleThroughout 2002, the Bush administration made clear that removing Saddam Hussein from power was a major goal. The principal stated justifications for the invasion included Iraqi production and use of weapons of mass destruction, alleged links with terrorist organizations, and human rights violations in Iraq under the Hussein government. Bush's advisers, notably Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, repeatedly opined that the Hussein government was responsible for the September 11 attacks.[33] Secretary of State Colin Powell and other officials in the administration echoed this claim, arguing that al Qaeda and Iraq had high-level and long-standing links.[34] These assertions would later be discredited by the intelligence community and retracted by Powell himself. [35] The Bush administration defended the invasion as a preemptive war, arguing that Iraq posed an imminent threat to U.S. national security. Many opponents of the Bush policy criticized this justification, arguing that preemptive wars are of questionable legality under international law and violate the U.N. Charter. Critics of the invasion have further argued that even if a preventive war were legal, Iraq did not pose an imminent threat to the U.S. and thus the invasion was a preventive war, which clearly violates international law.[36] In a 2004 interview with the BBC, then Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, stated that, "From our point of view and from the Charter point of view it (the war) was illegal." [37] In response to such claims, supporters of the invasion argue that Iraqi violations of UN Resolution 686, which demanded the cessation of all hostilities towards U.N. member states, justified the attack. Iraq had fired upon British and U.S. forces enforcing the no-fly zone on several occasions. [38] At the time of the invasion, U.N. inspection teams had searched for alleged weapons for nearly four months without finding them, and were willing to continue.[39][40] However, further delay in military action would have posed problems for an invasion due to seasonally rising temperatures, which would have made use of chemical protection gear unbearable as early as April.[41] On March 19 President Bush addressed the nation, stating that Saddam's weapons of mass destruction needed to be disarmed, and that the Iraqi people were to have control of their own country restored to them. The invasion began the next day.[42][43] Legality of invasionThe legality of the Iraq war invasion has been seriously challenged on a number of fronts from its inception. From the vantage point of international law, the U.S. and Britain have put forth two major arguments for the invasion's legality. The first argument holds that the use of force was authorized by existing U.N. Resolutions related to the first Gulf War (660, 678) and the subsequent, ongoing inspections of Iraqi weapons programs (1441). The latter resolution was most prominent during the run up to the war, and formed the main backdrop for Secretary of State Colin Powell's address to the Security Council one month before the invasion.[44]. At the same time, Bush Administration officials advanced a parallel legal argument using the earlier resolutions, which authorized force in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Under this reasoning, by failing to disarm and submit to inspections, Iraq was in violation of U.N. resolutions 660 and 678, and the U.S. was authorized to compel Iraq's compliance through military means. Critics of the legal rationale based on the U.N. resolutions argue that the legal right to determine how to enforce resolutions lies with the Security Council alone, not with individual nations. [45][46][47] Bush Administration officials have pointed out that, according to this reasoning, the Clinton Administration's decision to bomb Iraq in 1998 in Operation Desert Fox would also have been a violation of international law. The second major legal argument that the U.S. and Britain employed was that Iraq's behavior presented an imminent threat to the U.S. and world community, and that the invasion was therefore a form of "preemptive" self-defense. Self-defense in response to an armed attack has long been an acknowledged right of nations under international law. The question of whether preemptive force is permissible is less settled, as many international legal scholars believe that some right of preemptive self-defense exists when an attack is imminent. In the words of former U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster, when the need for action is "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."[48] Nevertheless, many legal scholars contend that the situation in Iraq presented no such imminent threat, and that the U.S. notion of preemptive was so broad as to render preemption meaningless. Several groups of international lawyers, including a coalition of Canadian lawyers and the U.S.-based Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) and the Western States Legal Foundation (WSLF) endorsed a statement that the U.S. invasion was "a fundamental breach of international law (that) would seriously threaten the integrity of the international legal order that has been in place since the end of the Second World War."[49] This opinion was echoed by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who said in September 2004, "From our point of view and the UN Charter point of view, it was illegal."[50] In the midst of these disagreements, which are still ongoing, several prominent supporters of the invasion in both the U.S. and Britain have publicly and privately cast doubt on its legality. Richard Perle, a senior member of the administration's Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, argued in November 2003, that the invasion was against international law, but still justified.[51][52] At the same time Tony Blair's Attorney General Lord Goldsmith, while concluding that a reasonable case could be made that resolution 1441 required no further resolution of the UN, he could not guarantee that an invasion in the circumstances would not be challenged on legal grounds.[53]
Military aspectsImage:Iraq map.png Map of Iraq United States military operations were conducted under the codename Operation Iraqi Freedom.[54] The United Kingdom military operation was named Operation Telic. Approximately 120,000 soldiers and Marines from the United States, and 45,000 from the United Kingdom, as well as smaller forces from other nations, collectively called the "Coalition of the Willing", were deployed prior to the invasion primarily to several staging areas in Kuwait. (The numbers when naval, logistics, intelligence, and air force personnel are included were approximately 248,000 American, 45,000 British, 2,000 Australians, 300 Danish, and 200 Polish personnel(commando squad)GROM.) Plans for opening a second front in the north were abandoned when Turkey officially refused the use of its territory for such purposes.[55] Forces also supported Iraqi Kurdish militia troops, estimated to number upwards of 50,000. Despite the refusal of Turkey, the Coalition conducted parachute operations in the north and dropped the 173rd Airborne Brigade, thereby removing the necessity of any approval from Turkey. The number of personnel in the Iraqi military prior to the war was uncertain, but it was believed to have been poorly-equipped.[56][57][58] The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated the Iraqi armed forces to number 389,000 (army 350,000, navy 2,000, air force 20,000 and air defense 17,000), the paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam 44,000, and reserves 650,000.[59] Another estimate numbers the army and Republican Guard at between 280,000 to 350,000 and 50,000 to 80,000, respectively,[60] and the paramilitary between 20,000 and 40,000.[61] There were an estimated thirteen infantry divisions, ten mechanized and armored divisions, as well as some special forces units. The Iraqi Air Force and Iraqi Navy played a negligible role in the conflict. In 2005, the CIA released a report saying that no weapons of mass destruction had been found in Iraq.[4] InvasionImage:Iraq invasion map US Army CMH.jpg The routes taken by the U.S. and British ground forces Prior to invasion, U.S.-led coalition forces involved in the 1991 Persian Gulf War had been engaged in a low-level conflict with Iraq, enforcing Iraqi no-fly zones. Iraqi air-defense installations were engaged on a fairly regular basis after repeatedly targeting and firing upon U.S. and UK air patrols. In mid-2002, the U.S. began to change its response strategy, more carefully selecting targets in the southern part of the country in order to disrupt the military command structure in Iraq. A change in enforcement tactics was acknowledged at the time, but it was not made public that this was part of a plan known as Operation Southern Focus. The tonnage of U.S. bombs dropped increased from 0 in March 2002 and 0.3 in April 2002 to between 7 and 14 tons per month in May-August, reaching a pre-war peak of 54.6 tons in September - prior to Congress' 11 October authorization of the invasion. The September attacks included a 5 September 100-aircraft attack on the main air defense site in western Iraq. According to an editorial in New Statesman this was "Located at the furthest extreme of the southern no-fly zone, far away from the areas that needed to be patrolled to prevent attacks on the Shias, it was destroyed not because it was a threat to the patrols, but to allow allied special forces operating from Jordan to enter Iraq undetected."[62] Dora Farms strikeThe night of March 19, 2003, U.S. forces abandoned the plan for initial, non-nuclear decapitation strikes against fifty-five top Iraqi officials, in light of reports that Saddam Hussein was visiting his daughters and sons, Uday and Qusay at Dora Farms, within the al-Dora farming community on the outskirts of Baghdad. At approximately 05:30 UTC four enhanced, satellite-guided 2,000-pound Bunker Busters GBU-27 and 40 Tomahawk cruise missiles were dropped on the compound. One missed the compound entirely and the other three missed their target landing on the other side of the wall of the palace compound. [5] [6] [7] Saddam Hussein was not present nor were any members of the Iraqi leadership or Hussein family. The attack resulted in the deaths of fifteen civilians, including nine women and one child.[63] Opening attackOn March 20, 2003 at approximately 02:30 UTC or about 90 minutes after the lapse of the 48-hour deadline, at 05:33 local time, explosions were heard in Baghdad. There is now evidence that various Special Forces and Special Operations troops from the coalition (including British SAS, the Australian SAS, the U.S. Army's Delta Force, U.S. Navy SEALs, U.S. Marine Corps Force Recon and U.S. Air Force Combat Controllers) crossed the border into Iraq well before the air war commenced, in order to guide strike aircraft in air attacks. At 03:15 UTC, or 10:15 p.m. EST, U.S. President George W. Bush announced that he had ordered the coalition to launch an "attack of opportunity" against targets in Iraq. As soon as this word was given the troops on standby crossed the border into Iraq. These troops were led by the 4th bomb disposal unit which at the time had three RAF Regiment airmen from 15 squadron on a tour. Before the invasion, many observers had expected a lengthy campaign of aerial bombing in advance of any ground action, taking as examples the Persian Gulf War or the invasion of Afghanistan. In practice, U.S. plans envisioned simultaneous air and ground assaults to decapitate the Iraqi forces as fast as possible (see Shock and Awe), attempting to bypass Iraqi military units and cities in most cases. The assumption was that superior Coalition mobility and co-ordination would allow the U.S.-led Coalition to attack the heart of the Iraqi command structure and destroy it in a short time, and that this would minimize civilian deaths and damage to infrastructure. It was expected that the elimination of the leadership would lead to the collapse of the Iraqi Forces and the government, and that much of the population would support the invaders once the government had been weakened. Occupation of cities and attacks on peripheral military units were viewed as undesirable distractions. Following Turkey's decision to deny any official use of its territory, the U.S.-led Coalition was forced to abandon a planned simultaneous attack from north and south, so the primary bases for the invasion were in Kuwait and other Persian Gulf nations. One result of this was that one of the divisions intended for the invasion was forced to relocate and was unable to take part in the invasion until well into the war. Many observers felt that the Coalition devoted insufficient numbers of troops to the invasion, and that this (combined with the failure to occupy cities) put them at a major disadvantage in achieving security and order throughout the country when local support failed to meet expectations. The invasion was swift, with the collapse of the Iraq government and the military of Iraq in about three weeks. The oil infrastructure of Iraq was rapidly secured with limited damage in that time. Securing the oil infrastructure was considered of great importance to funding the rebuilding of Iraq after the invasion ended. In the Persian Gulf War, while retreating from Kuwait, the Iraqi army had set many oil wells on fire, in an attempt to disguise troop movements and to distract Coalition forces. Prior to the 2003 invasion, Iraqi forces had mined some 400 oil wells around Basra and the Al-Faw peninsula with explosives. The British 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines launched an air and amphibious assault on the Al-Faw peninsula, supported by units of the Special Boat Service Royal Marines and US Navy SEALs during the closing hours of 20 March to secure the oil fields there; the amphibious assault was supported by frigates of the Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy. The United States Marine Corps' 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, attached to 3 Commando Brigade and the Polish Special Forces unit GROM attacked the port of Umm Qasr. The British Army's 16 Air Assault Brigade also secured the oilfields in southern Iraq in places like Rumaila while the Polish commandos captured offshore oil platforms near the port, preventing their destruction. Despite the rapid advance of Coalition forces, some 44 oil wells were destroyed and set blaze by Iraqi explosives or by incidental fire. However, the wells were quickly capped and the fires put out, preventing the ecological damage and loss of oil that had occurred at the end of the Persian Gulf War. In keeping with the rapid advance plan, the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division moved westward and then northward through the western desert toward Baghdad, while the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force moved along Highway 1 through the center of the country, and 1 (UK) Armoured Division moved northward through the eastern marshland. Initially, the U.S. 1st Marine Division fought through the Rumaila oil fields, and moved north to Nasariyah--a moderate-sized, Shi'ite dominated city with important strategic significance as a major road junction and its proximity to nearby Talil Airfield. The U.S Army 3rd Infantry Division defeated Iraqi forces entrenched in and around the airfield and bypassed the city to the west. On 23 March, U.S Marines and Special Forces units pressed the attack in and around Nasiriyah. During the battle an Air Force A-10 was involved in a case of fratricide that resulted in the death of six Marines.[64] Because of Nasiriyah's strategic position as a road junction, significant gridlock occurred as U.S forces moving north converged on the city's surrounding highways. With Nasiriyah and Tallil Airfield secured, U.S. forces gained an important logistical center in southern Iraq, establishing FOB/EAF Jalibah, some 10 miles outside of Nasiriyah through which additional troops and supplies were brought. The 101st Airborne Division continued their attack north behind the 3rd Infantry Division, and the 82nd Airborne Division began to consolidate in and around Tallil airfield for further operations. By 27-28 March, a severe sand storm slowed the U.S advance as the 3rd Infantry Division fought on the outskirts of Najaf and Kufa, with particularly heavy fighting in and around the bridge adjacent to the town of Kifl before moving north toward Karbala. Further south, the British 7 Armoured Brigade ('The Desert Rats') fought their way into Iraq's second-largest city, Basra, on 6 April, coming under constant attack by regulars and Fedayeen, while the Parachute Regiment cleared the 'old quarter' of the city that was inaccessible to vehicles. Entering Basra had only been achieved after two weeks of conflict, which included the biggest tank battle by British forces since World War II when the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards destroyed 14 Iraqi tanks on 27 March. Elements of 1 (UK) Armoured Division began to advance north towards U.S. positions around Al Amarah on 9 April. Pre-existing electrical and water shortages continued throughout the conflict and looting began as Iraqi forces collapsed. While British forces began working with local Iraqi Police to enforce order, REME (Royal Electrical Mechanical Engineers) and Royal Engineers of the British Army rapidly set up and repaired dockyard facilities to allow humanitarian aid began to arrive from ships arriving in the port city of Umm Qasr. After a rapid initial advance, the first major pause occurred in the vicinity of Karbala. There, U.S. Army elements met resistance from Iraqi troops defending cities and key bridges along the Euphrates River. These forces threatened to interdict coalition logistical supply routes as U.S. forces moved north. By the end of March, elements of the 82nd Airborne Division augmented with a mechanized infantry battalion task force of the U.S. 1st Armored Division began diversionary assaults in and around the city of Samawah in order to divert Iraqi forces that may have otherwise threatened the extended rear of the coalition's lead elements. Meanwhile, the U.S. 101st Airborne Division and infantry elements of the U.S. 1st Marine Division, supported by an armored battalion task force of the 1st Armored division and U.S. Marine and Army air support, attacked and secured the cities of Najaf and Karbala in order to prevent any Iraqi counterattacks from the east. These attacks effectively protected the eastern flank and rear of the 3rd Infantry Division, which allowed the western flank of the invasion to resupply and continue its advance north through the Karbala Gap and on toward Baghdad, where U.S Marine and British forces had already begun a preliminary assault on the outskirts of the city. Special OperationsImage:Iraq invasion northern front.gif The northern front during March and April 2003 The 2nd Battalion of the U.S. 5th Special Forces Group, United States Army Special Forces (Green Berets) conducted reconnaissance in the cities of Basra, Karbala and various other locations. In the North, the 10th Special Forces Group (10th SFG) had the mission of aiding the Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, de facto rulers of Iraqi Kurdistan since 1991, and employing them against the 13 Iraqi Divisions located in the vicinity of Kirkuk and Mosul. Turkey had officially forbidden any U.S. troops from using their bases or airspace, so lead elements of the 10th SFG had to make a detour infiltration; their flight was supposed to take four hours but instead took ten. Hours after the first of such flights, Turkey did allow the use of its air space and the rest of the 10th SFG infiltrated in. The preliminary mission was to destroy the base of the Kurdish terrorist group Ansar al-Islam, believed to be linked to Al Qaeda. Concurrent and follow-on missions involved attacking and fixing Iraqi forces in the north, thus preventing their deployment to the southern front and the main effort of the invasion. On March 26, 2003, the 173rd Airborne Brigade augmented the coalition's northern front by parachuting into northern Iraq onto Bashur Airfield, controlled at the time by elements of 10th SFG and Kurdish peshmerga. The fall of Kirkuk on 10 April 2003 to the 10th SFG and Kurdish peshmerga precipitated the 173rd's planned assault, preventing the unit's involvement in combat against Iraqi forces during the invasion. The liberation of Kirkuk came as a result of approximately two weeks of fighting that included the Battle of the Green Line(the unofficial border of the Kurdish autonomous zone) and the subsequent Battle of Kani Domlan Ridge(the ridgeline running northwest to southeast of Kirkuk), the latter fought exclusively by 3rd Battalion, 10th SFG and Kurdish peshmerga against the Iraqi I Corps. The 173rd would eventually take responsibility for Kirkuk days later, becoming involved in the counterinsurgency fight and remain there until redeploying a year later. After Sargat was taken, Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 10th SFG along with their Kurdish allies pushed south towards Tikrit and the surrounding towns of Northern Iraq. Previously, during the Battle of the Green Line, Bravo Company, 3/10 with their Kurdish allies pushed back, destroyed, or routed the 13th Iraqi Infantry Division. The same company took Tikrit. Iraq was the largest deployment of Special Forces since Vietnam. Fall of Baghdad (April 2003)Three weeks into the invasion, U.S. forces moved into Baghdad. Initial plans were for armored units to surround the city and gradually move in, forcing Iraqi armor and ground units to cluster into a central pocket in the city, and then attack with air and artillery forces. This plan soon became unnecessary, as an initial engagement of armor units south of the city saw most of the Republican Guard's armor assets destroyed and much of the southern outskirts of the city occupied. On 5 April TF 1-64 Armor of the U.S. Army executed a raid, later called the "Thunder Run", to test remaining Iraqi defenses, with 29 tanks and 14 Bradley Armored Fighting Vehicles rushing from a staging base to the Baghdad airport. They met heavy resistance, including many suicidal attacks, but were successful in reaching the airport. Two days later another thunder run was launched by the U.S. Army into the Palaces of Saddam Hussein, where they seized the palaces and government offices of central Baghdad. Within hours of the palace seizure, and television coverage of this spreading through Iraq, U.S. forces ordered Iraqi forces within Baghdad to surrender, or the city would face a full-scale assault. Iraqi government officials had either disappeared or had conceded defeat, and on April 9 2003, Baghdad was formally occupied by U.S. forces and the power of Saddam Hussein was declared ended. Much of Baghdad remained unsecured however, and fighting continued within the city and its outskirts well into the period of occupation. Saddam had vanished, and his whereabouts were unknown. Many Iraqis celebrated the downfall of Saddam by vandalizing the many portraits and statues of him together with other pieces of his personality cult. One widely publicized event was the dramatic toppling of a large statue of Saddam in central Baghdad by a U.S. M88 tank retriever, while a crowd of Iraqis cheered the Marines on. During this incident, the Marines briefly draped an American flag over the statue's face. The flag was replaced with an Iraqi flag and the demolition continued. The fall of Baghdad saw the outbreak of regional violence throughout the country, as Iraqi tribes and cities began to fight each other over old grudges. The Iraqi cities of Al-Kut and Nasiriyah declared war upon each other immediately following the fall of Baghdad in order to establish dominance in the new country, and Coalition forces quickly found themselves embroiled in a potential civil-war. U.S. forces ordered the cities to cease hostilities immediately, and explained that Baghdad would remain the capital of the new Iraqi government. Nasiriyah responded favorably and quickly backed down, however Al-Kut placed snipers on the main roadways into town, with orders that Coalition forces were not to enter the city. After several minor skirmishes, the snipers were removed, but tensions and violence between regional, city, tribal, and familial groups continued into the occupation period. General Tommy Franks assumed control of Iraq as the supreme commander of occupation forces. Shortly after the sudden collapse of the defense of Baghdad, rumors were circulating in Iraq and elsewhere that there had been a deal struck (a "safqua") wherein the U.S. had bribed key members of the Iraqi military elite and/or the Ba'ath party itself to stand down. In May 2003, General Franks retired, and confirmed in an interview with Defense Week that the U.S. had paid Iraqi military leaders to defect. The extent of the defections and their effect on the war are unclear. Coalition troops promptly began searching for the key members of Saddam Hussein's government. These individuals were identified by a variety of means, most famously through sets of most-wanted Iraqi playing cards. On 22 July 2003 during a raid by the U.S. 101st Airborne Division and men from Task Force 20, Saddam Hussein's sons Uday and Qusay, and one of his grandsons were killed. Saddam Hussein was captured on December 13 2003 by the U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division and members of Task Force 121 during Operation Red Dawn. Other areasIn the north, Kurdish forces opposed to Saddam Hussein had already occupied for years an autonomous area in northern Iraq. With the assistance of U.S. Special Forces and air strikes, they were able to rout the Iraqi units near them and to occupy oil-rich Kirkuk on 10 April. U.S. special forces had also been involved in the extreme south of Iraq, attempting to occupy key roads to Syria and airbases. In one case two armored platoons were used to convince Iraqi leadership that an entire armored battalion was entrenched in the west of Iraq. On 15 April, U.S. forces took control of Tikrit, the last major outpost in central Iraq, with an attack led by the Marines' Task Force Tripoli. About a week later the Marines were relieved in place by the Army's 4th Infantry Division. Summary of the invasionImage:AirForce over Iraq.jpg Aircraft of the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing and coalition counterparts stationed together at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, in southwest Asia, fly over the desert. April 14, 2003. Aircraft include KC-135 Stratotanker, F-15E Strike Eagle, F-117 Nighthawk, F-16CJ Falcon, British GR-4 Tornado, and Australian F/A-18 Hornet. Coalition forces managed to topple the government and capture the key cities of a large nation in only 21 days, taking minimal losses while also trying to avoid large civilian deaths and even high numbers of dead Iraqi military forces. The invasion did not require the huge army build-up like the 1991 Gulf War, which numbered half a million Allied troops. This did prove short-sighted, however, due to the requirement for a much larger force to combat the irregular Iraqi forces in the aftermath of the war. General Eric Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, recommended "several hundred thousand"[citation needed] troops be used, in order to maintain post-war order, but Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld—and especially his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz—strongly disagreed. General Abizaid later said Shinseki was right[citation needed]. The Iraqi army, armed mainly with Soviet-built equipment, was overall ill-equipped in comparison to Coalition forces. Missiles launched from Iraq were either interdicted by U.S. anti-air batteries, or made little to no strategic impact on their targets. Attacks on Coalition supply routes by Fedayeen militiamen were repulsed. The Iraq | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
